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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Alejandro Latorre
By Maryann Haggerty
At the time of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, Alejandro Latorre was an assistant vice
president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). He was active in the bailout of
American International Group (AIG) from its inception to the end, when AIG repaid its
outstanding obligations to both the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury. This Lessons
Learned summary is based on a Feb. 26, 2020, interview. He emphasized that the views
discussed here are his own, not the views of anyone else currently or previously within the
Federal Reserve System or the views of his current employer.
The right information is key: Finding and analyzing it will evolve as the crisis develops.
Good information is critical to good decisions and yet may be difficult to get in a crisis.
“Obtaining needed information at the right time was one of the biggest challenges
policymakers faced in the financial crisis,” Latorre said. He stressed that the “kind of
information you need varies across the phases” of a rescue as large as that of AIG.
To understand how information needs evolve in a crisis, Latorre said, it helps to think of the
AIG rescue in three phases: The initial decision on whether to intervene, the decision to
provide additional support via Maiden Lane III1, and the monitoring and oversight needed
to make sure the aid given to the company would be repaid. He said,
It’s about knowing—and this is I think is a key lesson—knowing what you know, and
knowing what you don’t know, and knowing what you need. I think we were pretty
effective at understanding the information we had, and the information we needed,
and the challenge then was how to close those gaps.
Before the crisis, the Federal Reserve, which did not regulate AIG, had little access to detailed
firm data. At that stage, Latorre said, “the key piece of information [needed] is really firmspecific information about the balance sheet, the income statements, in other words, the
capital, as well as the liquidity risk profile of the organization.”
He emphasized that several levels of information can be critical in the midst of a crisis:

Maiden Lane III was a special purpose vehicle created by the FRBNY to purchase from AIG counterparties
certain collateralized debt obligations (CDOS) in order to cancel the credit default swaps that AIG had written
on them. CDS are similar to a type of insurance that protects the buyer from a drop in value of the CDO. If the
value of the underlying CDO drops, even if there has been no actual loss, the owner may be entitled to
additional collateral under the CDS. In 2008, collateral calls with respect to the CDSs were creating great
liquidity stresses on AIG).
1
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And you need that information both at an aggregated or enterprise-wide level and,
importantly, you need that information, particularly liquidity information, at the legal
entity or subsidiary level.
According to Latorre, understanding the company’s role in the broader system is also key.
He said,
Importantly we also didn’t have a lot of detailed and consolidated, coherent
information about the ecosystem in which AIG was operating. … You also need to
understand the interconnectedness of a firm that is potentially at risk with the rest of
the market, especially when you’re in the midst of a crisis.
Latorre talked about how access to company information is not enough. The information
must be questioned and validated. He said,
In the beginning we relied to a large extent on AIG’s description and understanding
of what their exposures were and how those exposures were performing. But,
importantly, we validated that with the assistance and support of third parties
working for us at the time. For example, with respect to liquidity, we challenged the
accuracy and integrity of that information before making any decisions.
In the second phase of the rescue, after the Fed’s initial $85 billion loan facility was put in
place, the goal was to balance concerns about the company, the financial system, and the
public interest. The role of information shifted. Latorre explained, “We kind of understand
the company a little bit better, so I would say that while the information considerations are
important, they weren’t necessarily the binding constraint in this phase.”
At this point, the challenge became structuring the next part of the rescue, which involved
understanding the rating agencies’ positions. The rating agencies believed AIG was still in
trouble, Latorre said. He explained,
The rating agencies had seen the continued liquidity outflows due to the CDS [credit
default swap] positions and the size of the facility that the Fed had provided with the
support of Treasury. They were concerned about whether or not the firm could avoid
insolvency given these factors and the continued deterioration in markets. The
constraint here [was] really finding a solution. One that’s going to alleviate the
liquidity pressures on the firm, arising from the continued deterioration of these
positions, in a way that gives the rating agencies the confidence that these issues have
been addressed, but also, importantly, ensuring that the public interest is protected.
Ensuring that whatever risks that we’re taking in the solution are prudent and
ensuring that the economic gains for those risks would accrue appropriately to the
public.
And I would say lastly, continuing to ensure and promote financial stability. Because
at this juncture, the markets were still very fragile, and the worst of all possible
outcomes would have been for the company to have failed after the Fed and Treasury
committed to supporting it. This would have called into question the credibility of the
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Federal Reserve and Treasury and created more instability for markets and the
economy.
In the third phase, monitoring the company to protect the public interest was the prime
objective. At this point, AIG and the government moved to unwind the firm’s complicated
positions in derivatives markets and make other changes. The government needed enough
information to ensure that AIG’s decisions were prudent and did not jeopardize taxpayer
money. Latorre said,
The goal was to monitor [the AIG Financial Products subsidiary’s] approach and
progress. We were not directing the company to eliminate certain exposures at the
expense of others, we weren’t guiding them in terms of what levels that they should
exit at. Where we challenged them was, “what’s your framework for determining
that? How are you confident that the level at which you’re unwinding the portfolio is
the best one in order to achieve the orderly wind-down objective as well as preserve
values for the taxpayer?”
Latorre summarized, “Your information needs—knowing what you have and what you don’t
have and what you need—it’s very critical to maintain that awareness across these three
phases.”
You need help: Success requires all hands on deck.
Latorre shared that to overcome its information gap and ensure the credibility of data, the
AIG team at the FRBNY turned to a valuable internal asset: experts from throughout the
Federal Reserve System. He said,
I think one of the strengths of the Federal Reserve System is, and continues to be, the
diversity of talent and experience within the organization across different
disciplines—regulation and supervision, financial markets, and monetary policy. So,
when you’re faced with an information gap of the size and magnitude that we had,
and the stakes are as high as they were, closing the information gap always comes
down to the people.
Learn from experience: The AIG rescue still holds valuable lessons.
In Latorre’s eyes, there is still much the financial community and financial supervisors can
learn from the largest corporate rescue in U.S. history. He identified four topics that industry
and regulators should explore further.
● Firms need proper incentives to manage their risk prudently. Although he approves of
many of the post-crisis regulatory developments, Latorre also underlined the need to
refocus on basic risk management as a supervisory tool.
I think there’s been a lot of emphasis, certainly in the financial community as well as
the regulatory community, around building up liquidity and capital buffers, and all of
that’s very important in terms of stress testing. But in my view, those are means to an
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end. The end is to ensure that you have better-run firms so that they don’t find
themselves in the predicament that many of them found themselves in. How do you
ensure that firms have the proper internal governance to create incentives so that
they avoid races to the bottom like we saw in 2008? Importantly, how can both
macroprudential and microprudential supervisors contribute to that?”
● Market discipline still has a role. Latorre stressed the importance of market discipline,
which he said has fallen somewhat out of favor.
I think market discipline, post-crisis, has gotten a really bad reputation. But I feel like
there’s been a little bit of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. I think there’s a
question of how do we resurrect market discipline in a way so that it works in
congruence with prudent risk management as well as macroprudential and
microprudential objectives. I would say that is kind of critical. I know the agencies are
focused on ensuring firms are better run, but trying to really get at the incentives is
kind of critical.
● Increased transparency about risk management is a worthy goal. Latorre recognized that
this is a “delicate” topic—“Obviously, because you don’t want to reveal too much
information,” he said. He also acknowledged that “there's some constructive trends
happening in … the regulatory community on that score,” but questioned whether there
were opportunities for regulators to reveal more information because it is so important
to monitoring systemic risk.
● Supervisors should receive both macroprudential and microprudential training, so they are
prepared for both systemic and firm-specific events. Latorre talked about how regulating
systemic risk has come to mean macroprudential regulation. However, he questioned
whether such a singular focus is appropriate, and suggested that a more well-rounded
approach might have significant benefits. He said,
I would say in the fog of war, it’s very difficult to differentiate a firm-specific event, or
a microprudential event, from a macroprudential event. It’s very difficult to
distinguish between a liquidity event and a solvency event. … So, I think more training
and more support from the academic community around what does effective
supervision look like—how do you achieve not just effective macroprudential
supervision but also microprudential supervision—is warranted. I’m not suggesting
macroprudential is unimportant—only that it is incomplete.
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